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McC.: Torts--Landowner's Liability to Child Trespassers

CASE COMMENTS
court in the former suit, would the holding of the principal case,
making these issues res judicata in a collateral proceeding, plus the
language of W. VA. CODE c. llA, art. 4, § 38, to the effect that
procedural irregularities shall not invalidate the title transferred,
operate to give the purchaser a good title? While a definite answer
must depend upon the course of future decisions, the principal case
is such as to encourage greater reliance on the validity of land titles
transferred under W. VA. CODE c. 11A, art. 4 (Michie 1955).
L. L. P.

TORTs-LAnOwNEi's LxAnruxr
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on the case was brought by P, a ten year old lad, who was injured
following an explosion of a mixture contained in a can or filter found
by the boy on or near a playground located on D coal company's
leasehold. D and other coal companies customarily dumped rubbish
and refuse on or near the playground area. Judgment for P. On
appeal, held, reversed and new trial ordered. Although D, in the
absence of the exercise of ordinary care, would be liable for injuries
sustained by a foreseeable child trespasser who is injured by a dangerous instrumentality D maintains on his land, P here failed to
prove by substantial evidence that D had dumped the can or filter
on or near the playground. Justice v. Amherst Coal Co., 101 S.E.2d
860 (W. Va. 1958).
At early common law no duty of care, other than to refrain
from inflicting willful and wanton injury, was owed the trespasser,
whether he be a child or adult. PRossER, TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
As society became more highly industrialized and urbanized it
became apparent that the harsh effects resulting from the strict
common law rule invited modification of the rule itself, particularly in
respect to child trespassers, since the value of the child to the community was quite as important as the private right of the landowner
to the unfettered use of his land. See James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 68 YALE L.J. 144, 161
(1958).
An affirmative duty of care was first imposed upon the landowner in Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657
(1873). Here the child trespasser, coming upon the land to play,
was injured by D's unlocked unguarded turntable. The Stout case,
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though not immediately adopted by other jurisdictions, has served
as a basis for the development of the attractive nuisance or turntable doctrine of liability. See Green, Landowners' Responsibility
to Children, 27 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1948).
As the doctrine was originally conceived, the element of allurement or attractiveness was a key feature in finding the landowner
liable. That is, the child must have been attracted to the property
by a visible instrumentality thereon, dangerous in nature, such as
an unlocked turntable. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258
U.S. 268 (1922); Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12,
151 S.W.2d 565 (1941). However, allurement is no longer a
material element in the great majority of jurisdictions, and in
that respect at least, the doctrine is certainly misnamed. See e.g.,
Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 861 Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949);
Standard Oil Co. v. Dumas, 183 Ark. 616, 38 S.W.2d 17 (1931).
The modern attractive nuisance doctrine would impose a duty
of care upon a landowner who maintains a dangerous instrumentality on his property if (1) it is foreseeable that children will trespass, (2) that injury to them is probable, (3) that they are too
young to realize the risk involved, and (4) the utility of maintaining
the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children
involved thereon. RESTATEME=T, ToHTs § 389 (1934); PRossE,
ToRTs § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
The modified Restatement version of the doctrine has been
adopted and applied by the majority of American jurisdictions. See
Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1444 (1929); 53 A.L.R. 1844 (1928); 45 A.L.R.
982 (1926); 36 A.L.R. 34 (1925). A minority of states have flatly
rejected the doctrine, see e.g., Bottum's Adm'r v. Potomac F. & P.
Ry., 105 Va. 226, 53 S.E. 113 (1906); Ryan v. Towar, 128 Mich.
463, 87 N.W. 644 (1901), while Oklahoma appears to have rejected
it in part. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Beers, 185 Okla. 331, 91 P.2d
777 (1938). Other jurisdictions, while not adopting the doctrine
by name, have apparently applied it in principle. Mayer v. Temple
Properties Inc., 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954); Strang v.
South New Jersey Broadcasting Co., 10 N.J. Super. 486, 77 A.2d

502 (1950).
West Virginia, while consistently repudiating the doctrine by
name, Tiller v. Baisden, 128 W. Va. 126, 35 S.E.2d 728 (1945); Ritz
v. City of Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262, 31 S.E. 993 (1898), has adopted
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and followed a principle, often termed the dangerous instrumentality rule, which is closely akin to the doctrine. See Richards v.
Hope Construction & Refining Co., 121 W. Va. 650, 5 S.E.2d 810
(1939).
The rule, as applied in West Virginia, would hold a landowner
who maintains a dangerous instrumentality on his land, liable to
a child trespasser who is injured by the instrumentality if (1) the
presence of the trespasser is known or foreseeable and (2) the
dangerousness of the instrumentality is hidden, concealed, or latent
when handled by one unfamiliar with its use. White v. Kanawha
City Co., 127 W. Va. 566, 84 S.E.2d 17 (1945); Adams v. Virginian
Gasoline & Oil Co., 109 W. Va. 631, 156 S.E. 63 (1930); see Beatty,
The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in the Virginias, 10 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 20 (1958).
Applying the rule, the West Virginia court has held powder,
gasoline, and electric wires to be dangerous instrumentalities, since
their capacity to inflict harm is concealed or latent. Parsons v.
AppalachianElectricPower Co., 115 W. Va. 450, 176 S.E. 862 (1934);
Wiseman v. Terry, 111 W. Va. 620, 163 S.E. 424 (1932). On the
other hand, fire, barbed wire, and pools have been held not to constitute dangerous agencies within the rule, the theory being that
even a child of tender years can recognize the apparent dangers
involved. Tiller v. Baisden, supra; White v. Kanawha City Co.,
supra; Beacher v. McFarland, 183 Va. 1, 31 S.E.2d 279 (1944).
The principal case finds a foreseeable trespasser being injured
by a latently dangerous instrumentality, but recovery being denied
because P was unable to prove by substantial evidence that D had
in fact placed the dangerous agency on his land. Apparently then,
West Virginia would predicate liability on the landowner himself
having created or maintained the dangerous agency.
A situation analogous in nature has been lately decided in favor
of the trespasser in a jurisdiction which accepts the Restatement
modification of the attractive nuisance' doctrine. Simmel v. New
Jersey Coop. Co., 136 A.2d 801 (N.J. 1957); see Strang v. South
New Jersey Broadcasting Co., supra. In the Simmel case, an infant
was injured by a bonfire placed upon the land by another trespasser. Holding the landowner liable, the New Jersey court ruled,
that as a logical extension of the Restatement definition, liability
may be imposed upon the landowner, even though he neither
created nor maintained the dangerous instrument, if he were aware
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of its existence or could have been made aware of its existence by
an inspection of the land.
The Simmel case offers a good example of the trend in some
jurisdictions toward imposing a greater burden of care on the landowner in regard to infant trespassers. While such an extension of
the landowner's liability may be practical in highly urbanized jurisdictions, it would not seem to be desirable or necessary to impose
this additional duty on a landowner in a jurisdiction such as West
Virginia, which has few densely populated centers.
Nevertheless, the instant West Virginia case suggests the need
for a redefining of the dangerous instrumentality rule. The court,
while consistently repudiating the attractive nuisance doctrine, has
applied a dangerous instrumentality rule which is in essence little
more than a modification of the doctrine itself. This basic anomaly
results in uncertainty, not only as to the extent of the landowner's
duty of care and liability, but also as to the elements and proof the
plaintiff must show in order to recover.
It would seem then, that a modem dangerous instrumentality
rule should not only reflect an intention to keep the landowner's
liability within reasonable limits, but should also incorporate and
set out more definite standards regarding duty of care, liability,
and recovery. It is submitted that this two-fold purpose could best
be effected by adoption of the rules set out in RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 389 (1934).
D. L. McC.

Wn.s-HOLoGAPiimc

CANCELLATION

OF LIFE ESTATE ALSO

CANCELS REMAINDER.-By holographic will, T left a life estate in the
sum of tventy thousand dollars to each of five named beneficiaries,
and at the death of each, the principal to a charity. Before his
death, ' lined out the names of two of the designated life tenants.
Held, that inasmuch as the will must be given effect as it appeared
at T's death, deletion of the life estates also deleted the dependent
remainders. Sheltering Arms Hospital v. First and Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 100 S.E.2d 721 (Va. 1957).

By nearly identical statutes, holographic wills-those wholly in
the handwriting of the testator-are valid in the Virginias. W. VA.
CODE c. 41, art. 1, § 3 (Michie 1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-51
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